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THE PRESS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL
TRIALS: GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v.
SUPERIOR COURT
The free press in America promotes meaningful democracy by in-
forming the public about government conduct.' Because freedom of
the gress is a first amendment guarantee,2 courts rigorously scruti-
nize? governmental attempts to encroach on press activities.4 Media
1. The Supreme Court has recognized, on several occasions, the press' role in aid-
ing public supervision of government. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (the press as "'agent' of
interested citizens"); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 863, 864 (1974) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (the press as "agent of the public at large"). See generally Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Coin, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (because individuals have limited
time and resources, they rely on the press to provide them with information about
governmental activity). Further, the Court has made numerous references to the role
the press should theoretically play in the operation of democracy. See, e.g., Houchins
v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (characterizing the media as an institution sepa-
rate from the government yet instrumental in prompting remedial action within the
government); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (referring to media as "con-
stitutionally chosen means" for insuring faithfulness of elected officials to the public);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (calling the press a "mighty catalyst in awak-
ening public interest in governmental affairs"). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) (arguing that the first
amendment is aimed at preventing bad public planning which often results from in-
sufficient public awareness); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34
(1975) (explaining the structural essence of the press as a strong extra-governmental
"branch" providing an overall check of the tri-partite governmental checks-and-bal-
ances scheme).
2. The first amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Press," in
this Comment, refers to all forms of news media.
3. For examples of the application of strict scrutiny in a variety of first amend-
ment contexts, see Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S.
87 (1982) (state must show substantial relationship between restrictions on political
associations and a compelling state interest); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(associational restrictions may be imposed only via the least restrictive means);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (statute restricting religious freedom
must address specific conduct considered to be dangerous).
In every case before the Supreme Court in which first amendment interests conflict,
the issue becomes whether to balance first amendment rights against other interests
guaranteed by the Constitution or to consider first amendment rights absolute. See
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coverage of criminal trials provides an important check on the judici-
ary,5 yet the coverage occasionally confficts with the trial partici-
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (193 1) ("protection even as to previous restraint
of free speech is not unlimited"). See also Gunther, In Search ofJudicial Duality on a
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972). Perhaps
the most vocal extra-judicial proponent of absolute protection for freedom of expres-
sion is Professor A. Meiklejohn. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (1961); Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amend-
ment Mean?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 461, 464-66 (1953).
Rather than attempt to balance one constitutional interest against another, the
Warren Court tested restrictive legislation for potential overbreadth. The Warren
Court found overbroad those statutes which potentially invaded the first amendment
rights of individuals whose behavior the state did not directly seek to punish. Under
this theory, a less restrictive means could avoid the overbroad statute's "chilling ef-
fect" on an individual's exercise of personal liberties. See United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967) (federal act forbidding members of Communist organizations from
employment in defense facilities encroached on both proscribable and permissible
activity).
The Burger Court has criticized this approach as "too speculative." It has devel-
oped a narrower "substantial overbreadth" test. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (discussing at length why organiza-
tions that do not use 75% of their income for charitable purposes cannot be barred
from soliciting); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (rejecting overbreadth attack
on a federal act permitting the discharge of employees to "promote the efficiency of
the service"); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (emphasizing substantial
overbreadth theme in upholding a statute which affected "conduct" rather than
"speech"). See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 844 (1970) (purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to avoid restricting the first
amendment rights of parties whose conduct the legislature did not contemplate regu-
lating). Cf. Gunther, Refections on RobeLd It's Not What the Court Did But the Way
That It DidIt, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140, 1147-48 (1968) (criticizing the Court's failure
to discuss viable, less restrictive alternatives to "overbroad" statutes). For general
discussions of the overbreadth and substantial overbreadth doctrines, see G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1185-95 (1980) and L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 710-14 (1978).
4. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting
Florida's state interest justification of a "right of reply" law that encroached on press
freedom by allowing political candidates equal space to respond to criticism); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (declining to re-
strain publication of Pentagon Papers for lack of convincing national security argu-
ments); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (refusing to find libel
liability without a showing of malicious publication of a damaging untruth).
The press may be subject to criminal or civil sanctions for printing false and defam-
atory information. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (upheld
civil liability for libelous publication); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (upheld
civil liability for invading privacy); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (up-
held criminal libel statute).
5. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966):
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
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pants' rights and interests.6 In 1923, the Massachusetts Legislature
enacted a statute mandating courtroom closure during testimony by
juvenile sex offense victims.7 The United States Supreme Court held
in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court" that the Massachusetts
statute's mandatory operation reached beyond the state's compelling
interests in protecting the victim. The statute impermissibly re-
stricted the press' constitutionally protected right of access to criminal
trials.9
In Globe, a trial judge ordered courtroom closure of an entire rape
trial' O pursuant to the Massachusetts statute." Unable to gain access
to the courtroom,' 2 the Globe attacked the statute as an unconstitu-
tional encroachment on freedom of the press.' 3 The Superior Court
of Massachusetts dismissed the constitutional issues as moot.' 4 To
avoid future confusion, the Massachusetts court narrowed the stat-
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard
is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Id. at 350. See also J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 67 (1825)
(publicity "is the soul of justice").
6. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 278, § 16A (West 1923), provides in pertinent part:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other
crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person
upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, ...
the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom, admit-
ting only such persons as may have a direct interest in the case.
Id.
8. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
9. Id. at 602.
10. Id. at 598.
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 278, § 16A (West 1923).
12. 457 U.S. at 598. The Globe first moved that the trial court revoke the closure
order, hear arguments, and allow the Globe to intervene. The Court denied these
motions. The Globe then petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for
extraordinary relief. A single Justice held a hearing at which the Commonwealth
waived whatever right it had to exclude the press. Nevertheless, the justice denied
access. The Globe then appealed to the full Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 600.
13. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360
(1980).
14. Id. at 847-48, 401 N.E.2d at 362. The court dismissed the constitutional issues
as moot because the trial was over, yet formally construed the statute in order to
prevent a similar conflict in the future. Id.
1984]
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ute's scope, construing it to mandate closure only during the juvenile
complainant's testimony.15 The Massachusetts court also noted that
the statute promoted compelling state interests. 6 First, closure ar-
guably reduced the emotional stress that often accompanies testifying
before an unfamiliar audience. 7 Second, closure may abate the nat-
ural reluctance of sex offense victims to report crimes and testify for
the state.18
The Massachusetts court subsequently reconsidered the Globe's
challenge 9 in light of the United States Supreme Court's intervening
15. 379 Mass. at 853, 401 N.E.2d at 365. The court listed principles of statutory
construction, stressing its intent to interpret the statute consistently with the legisla-
ture's purpose. Id. Since the statute states merely that "at the trial ... the presiding
justice shall exclude the general public from the courtroom," MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
278, § 16A (West 1923), one justice read the statute to mandate closure of the entire
trial. 379 Mass. at 866,401 N.E.2d at 372 (Quirico, J., dissenting). The Massachusetts
court grappled with the ambiguous meaning of "at the trial," and decided that since
the state's previous case law offered no assistance in construing the phrase, the court
should focus on the legislative policies behind the statute. Id. at 851-53, 861, 401
N.E.2d at 364-65, 370. The court then balanced the historical and constitutional argu-
ments for open public trials against the psychological and evidentiary value derived
from protecting a young sex offense victim from undue public scrutiny. Id. at 855-61,
401 N.E.2d at 366-69. The court concluded that despite the strong historical pre-
sumption in favor of open criminal trials, the state had a valid interest in mandating
courtroom closure, but only during the victim's testimony. Id. at 861-63, 401 N.E.2d
at 370-71. Further, in defining the class of "distinguished persons" who could be
lawfully denied admission during testimony, the court held that the psychological
harm which press attendance could impart on the victim outweighed its legitimate,
non-voyeuristic purpose. Id. at 863-65, 401 N.E.2d at 371-72.
16. 379 Mass. at 857-63, 401 N.E.2d at 367-70.
17. Id. at 857-63, 401 N.E.2d at 3 67-70. See generally Librai, The Protection ofthe
Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
977, 984 (1969) (psychiatrists have found the "official atmosphere" in the courtroom
capable of inflicting severe and prolonged emotional harm in children). Librai rec-
ommends technical innovations during testimony such as closed circuit television
cameras and one-way mirrors in order to reduce the stress of having to testify before a
"live audience." Id. at 1003.
For a thorough discussion of the criminal justice system's insensitivity toward rape
victims, see Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977). Berger advocates closure as a means of "mitigating
trauma." Id. at 88-89.
18. 379 Mass. at 857-61, 401 N.E.2d at 367-70. For a discussion of the frustration
and inconvenience imposed upon crime victims when they are reduced to the status of
mere witness, see H. BROWNELL, THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMs OF CRIME (1976); T. Mc-
CAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FiSCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 211-12 (1979); Boh-
mer and Blumberg, Twice Traumatized- The Rape Victim and the Court, 58
JUDICATURE 390 (1975).
19. 449 U.S. 894 (1980). Globe appealed the state decision to the United States
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decision Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.2 In Richmond, the
Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment affords the press a
protected right of access to criminal trials."' The Massachusetts
court, applying the Richmond rule, nevertheless maintained that the
statute did not unjustifiably restrict the press' right of access, because
of the compelling nature of the state's interests. 2 The United States
Supreme Court reversed this holding,23 concluding that the statute's
mandatory operation rendered it overly restrictive regardless of the
state's admittedly compelling goals.24
In a series of cases decided in the mid-1970's dealing with press
access to prisons and inmates, 5 the Supreme Court established that
the press may claim no greater right of access to information than the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the state court for
reconsideration. Id.
20. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). For a discussion of Richmond Newspapers, see infra
notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
21. 448 U.S. at 575-81.
22. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 383 Mass. 838, 848-52, 423 N.E.2d
773, 779-81 (1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). The Massachusetts court summarized
the compelling aspects of the state's interests:
a) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute complaints and give
testimony. . . b) to protect minor victims of certain sex crimes from public
degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psychological damage ... ; c) to
enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors, free of confusion,
fright, or embellishment. . . ; d) to promote the sound and orderly administra-
tion of justice ... ; e) to preserve evidence and obtain just convictions.
Id. at 848, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
23. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
24 Id. at 602. Although the state court's construction of the statute limited
mandatory closure to the victim testimony segment, the Supreme Court invoked the
overbreadth doctrine and declared the statute invalid. The majority reasoned that
mandatory closure of even small parts of trials might operate in unwarranted situa-
tions and would therefore be an exercise of legislative overreach. Id. See supra note
3 for a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine and infra notes 70-90 and accompany-
ing text for further discussion of the Globe holding.
25. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974); PeU v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The factual situations of
all three cases are very similar. In Pell, a request for prison interviews arose in the
aftermath of a violent disruption which state prison officials attributed to certain pris-
oners that had attained notoriety as subjects of earlier individual interviews. 417 U.S.
at 831. While no violence had occurred in the federal prison in Saxbe, the Court
nevertheless found the Saxbe situation "constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell
• . . and thus fully controlled by that case." 417 U.S. at 850. In Houchins, a state
prison was the location of a suicide and several physical assaults. Reporters wanted
to inspect allegedly adverse living conditions. 438 U.S. at 4-5.
1984]
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general public.26 The scope of this doctrine is limited by the non-
public nature of prisons.27 The press' right of access to the criminal
courtroom, however, is implicit in the Anglo-American tradition of
open trials.28
The sixth amendment explicitly grants criminal defendants the
right to a public trial.29 The policy of open criminal trials not only
26. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (Stewart, J.) (while the
first and fourteenth amendments prohibit government interference with the press, the
Constitution does not require that government avail the press of information not ac-
cessible to the general public). For the theoretical and historical underpinnings of
this position, see Stewart, supra note 1, at 636.
27. See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12; Pell, 417 U.S. at 826, 827 (because the
function of a prison is to confine sometimes dangerous persons, security considera-
tions are important enough to justify prohibitions of "face-to-face" contact between
prisoners and outsiders). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-21, at 688-91 (dis-
cussion of public forums, and non-forum government institutions in the context of
freedom of speech).
The dissenting opinions in the prison cases urged further limitation of the majority
holdings by quoting from the dictum of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707
(1972): "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be viscerated," and "newsgathering is not without its first amendment protections."
See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 28 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell, 417 U.S. at 859
(Powell, J., dissenting joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.). This argument
resurfaces in the Chief Justice's opinion in Richmond. See infra notes 64-66 and ac-
companying text.
28. In both the United States and Great Britain, public trials are the historical
norm. Criminal trials, especially, are presumptively open. See, e.g., E. JENKS, THE
BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967); A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL
VIRGINIA 128-29 (1930); Reinsh, The English Common Law in the Early American
Colonies, I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 367, 397 (1907).
Distrust of secret trials has roots in the Spanish Inquisition, the English Star Cham-
ber, which elicited confessions by torture, and the French Monarchy's abuse of the
letre de cachet. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948). See generally
Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
29. The sixth amendment guarantees in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI. As incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, sixth
amendment rights are guaranteed at the state as well as federal level. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (recognizing state defendant's
right to a public trial).
Since In re Oliver, the court has had several occasions to interpret the sixth amend-
ment public trial guarantee. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979) (only the criminal defendant, not the public or press, may use the sixth amend-
ment to challenge courtroom closure); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538 (1965) (the
sixth amendment is a guarantee of the accused). Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24, 35 (1965) (the sixth amendment does not give the defendant the converse right to
compel courtroom closure) (dictum).
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protects the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial,3°
but also allows the public to supervise and participate in justice ad-
ministration.31 The press serves as agent and educator for members
of the general public.32 Trial judges in most jurisdictions, however,
have discretion to limit public access in order to ensure decorum 33
30, The criminal defendant is guaranteed a "fair trial" by the due process clauses
of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
31. Open trials promote societal interests beyond the defendant's immediate con-
cerns, When fully informed of the circumstances giving rise to a particular criminal
activity, the public may prompt extra-judicial reform through public discussion and
political pressure. See Note, Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right ofPublic
Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1908 n.45 (1978) (public dis-
cussion of the Watergate affair resulted in legislative reforms of campaign practices).
Awareness of trial proceedings may also prompt members of the public who possess
pertinent information to come forward and testify. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834,
at 436 n.2 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976).
Open trials also help to maintain or increase public confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system. See Arnold. The Criminal Trial as a Symbol ofPublic Morality, CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 141-43 (A. Howard ed. 1965); Mueller, Problems Posedby
Publicit to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1961) (open
criminal trials culminating with an appropriate penal sentence satisfy the public re-
venge instinct); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 130-31 (1956). At a minimum,
open trials create the appearance of justice. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 362
U.S. 610. 616 (1960) (right to a public trial reflects the common law concept that
-justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice") (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
Finally, even what appears to be merely morbid curiosity in the more lurid details
of a crime may be the outgrowth of legitimate concern that justice is administered
properly. See Note, supra, at 1906. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350
(1966) ("we have consistently required that the press have a free hand, even though
we sometimes deplored its sensationalism"). See generally Stephenson, Fair Trial-
Free Press. Rights in Continuing Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 39, 40 (1979) (noting
a "direct link between the potential for sensationalism in a particular case and the
extent of press coverage"); Hough, Felonies, Jury Trial and News Reports, reprinted in
F. SIEBERT, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 36-48 (1970).
32. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 n.2 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (the press as "'agent' of interested citizens"); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (the press as
"agent of the public at large"). See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (because individuals have limited time and resources, they rely
on the press to provide them with information about governmental activity).
33. E.g., United States v. Akers, 542 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1976) (upheld closure
when verdict was returned, in anticipation of protest against an unfavorable verdict),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977); Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 1975)
(upheld bailiff's exclusionary action during closing arguments); United States ex rel.
Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (approving lower court's exclusion order
1984]
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and the safety of witnesses.3 4 Often, trial judges exercise their statu-
torily granted discretion specifically to protect the emotional well-be-
ing of juvenile sex offense victims. 35
While public access and press coverage of criminal trials generally
enhance trial faimess, 36 excessive pretrial publicity often jeopardizes
subsequent juror impartiality.37 In the 1950's and 1960's, the increas-
ing presence of the media at trials led to Supreme Court considera-
tion of the apparent imbalance between trial fairness and press
freedom. 38 The Court overturned criminal convictions when defend-
ants showed that publicity had prejudiced their cases. 39 While the
to prevent a possible attempt by defendant and sympathizers to disrupt orderly pres-
entation), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966).
34. E.g., United States v. Herandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1979) (exclu-
sion based on threats to victim, a government agent, and his family); United States ex
rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975), (to preserve identity of still active
undercover agents), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d
667, 670 (2d Cir. 1972) (public excluded during discussion of airliner's confidential
method for detecting potential hijackers), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); United
States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (some spectators removed
to avoid harassment of witness), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970).
35. See, e.g., Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) (most spectators
excluded from rape case in which complainants were "of tender years" to avoid em-
barrassment and inhibition), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Melanson v. O'Brien,
191 F.2d 963, 965 (Ist Cir. 1951) (general public excluded by Massachusetts law dur-
ing a sex crime case involving a minor victim).
State statutes which provide for discretionary closure of cases involving sexual as-
saults against minors include: ALA. CODE § 12-21-202 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.3 (1973); GA. CODE § 81-1006 (1956 Rev.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (West
1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:8 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney
1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901 (1973); Wis. STAT.
§ 970.03(4) (Supp. 1981). Only Massachusetts has interpreted its statute as
mandatory. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 5 for the Court's summary of the press' role in criminal trial
coverage as quoted in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
37. See infra note 39.
38. In a landmark case, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court held that
the disruptive presence of television cameras and reporters in the courtroom and ex-
cessive pretrial publicity, all conducted over the defendant's objections, deprived the
defendant of due process. Id. The Court nevertheless held that because the public
has a right to know about criminal proceedings, television reporters may be present in
the courtroom in a nonobtrusive manner. Id. at 541-42. See also A. FRIENDLY & R.
GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLIcrTy 207-08 (1967) (arguing that the problem with tele-
vision reporting of criminal matters is not that it reaches a greater audience than the
print media, but that it often exhibits a much lower level of taste and restraint).
39. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1965) (rejecting the specific
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press and bar responded to the alarming number of reversals with
self-imposed guidelines,' the judiciary attempted to regulate public-
ity by employing more stringent measures.41
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,42 the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a trial judge's restrictive order to the press 43 and
evidence of prejudice test and adopting the standard enunciated in Rideau v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963), that a showing of "inherent prejudice" would merit
reversal).
See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Sheppard was a murder case
which received national publicity. At voir dire, all but one juror admitted to having
read about the defendant prior to trial. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court ordered a new
trial, stressing that total lack of judicial supervision of the press is a breach of duty to
the defendant. Id. at 357-58. Accord Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (trial
court refused to grant a change of venue even though a local television station tele-
vised defendant's inadvertent confession); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (eight
out of twelve jurors read that defendant confessed to committing the six murders and
they believed him guilty before trial began); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959) (per cunam) (several jurors learned from press reports outside the courtroom
that defendant had a record of two prior felonies); Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50
(195 1) (per curiam) (Jackson, J., concurring, emphasized that excessive inflammatory
publicity provoked hostile public opinion in community during trial of black defend-
ants charged with raping a white girl). But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195
(1952) (Court upheld murder conviction, finding heavy publicity not dispositive);
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949) (broad-
casts following arrest of man charged with brutal murders did not render fair trial
impossible, and defendant could show no specific evidence of prejudice), cert denied,
338 U.S. 912 (1950). See generally A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, supra note 38, at 28
(discussing the difficulty determining whether a jury was swayed by information in
the press, or was adequately convinced of guilt by the evidence at trial).
40. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
FAIR TRIAL, FAIR TRIAL/FREE PRESS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS (1974) (three-year
study of efforts taken by state bar and press associations to develop standards of self-
regulation); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS (L. Andrews ed. 1981). See
generally A. BARTH, RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (1976) ("Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Justice, Publicity, and the First Amendment"); P. REARDON &
C. DANIEL, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS RATIONAL DEBATE SEMINARS (1968)
(whether the ABA standards are in fact too restrictive).
41. See, e.g., People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1967) (at the trial of
a notorious alleged murderer, the judge issued a strict set of rules designed to limit the
chance that jurors might obtain extra-evidentiary information), modfied, 403 U.S. 946
(1971 ) (sentence of death vacated).
42 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
43. Id. at 570. The state trial judge issued an order to journalists and broadcasters
to refrain from publicizing any of defendant's admissions to law enforcement officials
prior to jury impanelment. The state had charged defendant with the sexual assault
and murder of six family members in a small, rural Nebraska town. Id. at 539, 542.
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provided trial courts with a basic framework for balancing the rights
of press and defendant.' Acknowledging the high level of publicity
attending the defendant's prosecution for murder, the Stuart trial
court ordered the media to refrain from reporting any "strongly im-
plicative" facts or accounts of confessions.45 The Supreme Court
held that the trial court's vague order was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on freedom of the press." Further, the Court noted the trial
court's failure to consider alternatives to issuing the broad order.
4 7
In Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,48 the Court first considered
whether the press has a right of access to criminal proceedings based
44. 427 U.S. at 564-70. The Court employed Judge Learned Hand's formula:
whether "the gravity of 'the evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such inva-
sion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), a'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Thus, the Court evaluated
"(a) the nature and extent of pre-trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures
would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity; and (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger." 427
U.S. at 562.
The Court concluded that trial courts must first consider the alternative measures
outlined in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-62 (1966), ie., change in venue,
postponement of trial, thorough voir dire to screen out prejudiced veniremen, strong
instructions to the jury to consider only the evidence introduced at trial, and seques-
tration of jurors. 427 U.S. at 563-64.
45. 427 U.S. at 541.
46. Id. at 562-68. In explaining the judicial presumption of invalidity concerning
prior restraints, Chief Justice Burger said:
[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolera-
ble infringement of First Amendment rights. . . . A prior restraint. . . has an
immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or
civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least
for the time. . . . [T]he protection against prior restraint should have particular
force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings ...
The anti-publication order's vagueness operated to make it an overly broad "gag or-
der." Since the press could not determine before publishing an item whether the
court might later consider it a "strongly implicative fact," the press was in effect cen-
sored from printing any information concerning judicial procedure before the trial's
outcome. Id. at 565-70. Further, the Court conceded that the trial court judge's belief
that publicity would continue to be heavy may have been justified. Nevertheless, the
judge's conclusion that the publicity would prejudice jurors was too speculative to
merit such a sweeping order against publication. Id. at 562-63, 565. See generally A.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975) (discussing the policy against prior
restraints); Note, Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REV. 994, 1064-67 (1965) (discussing the
problem of drafting and enforcing non-specific decrees).
47. 427 U.S. at 569. See supra note 44 for a list ofjudicially acceptable alternative
routes to prior restraint orders.
48. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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on the sixth amendment guarantee of public trials.49 The Court re-
jected the Gannett newspaper's sixth amendment challenge to an or-
der which closed a pretrial hearing.5" The plurality opinion, in
dictum, limited the right to invoke the sixth amendment public trial
guarantee to criminal defendants only.5' The Court suggested that
the first amendment, rather than the sixth, might afford the press a
right of access to criminal proceedings.52 If such a right did exist, the
Court noted, the trial court's order in Gannett would not have vio-
lated the first amendment because the judge adequately balanced the
interests of the defendant against those of the press.53 Further, the
Court stressed the greater need to guard against publicity of pretrial
matters as opposed to actual trial proceedings.54
49. Id. at 384-91. See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a
public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property. . . Those who
see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.").
50. Id. at 375. In Gannett, the defendants were suspected of second-degree mur-
der, robbery and grand larceny. The defendants moved to suppress from trial alleg-
edly involuntary statements they had made to police, as well as physical evidence
seized during their arrest. Further, the trial judge granted a motion for exclusion of
the press from the hearing to avoid further excessive adverse publicity. The press did
not object until after the suppression hearing concluded, and at that time the judge
refused to vacate his order, or to release transcripts of the hearing, although acknowl-
edging the press's right to make the objection. Id. at 374-75.
51. 443 U.S. at 387 (Stewart, J.) ("by the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
public trials were clearly associated with the protection of the defendant"). Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Brennan, concurred in the judg-
ment but dissented from the holding on the issue of who is meant to benefit from the
public trial guarantee. Id. at 406, 415. Justice Blackmun wrote that the majority's
result allows attorneys and judges to agree too easily to closure without considering
the public's interests in access. Id. at 406.
52. Id. at 391-92 (Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart declined to decide in the abstract
whether this right does exist in the first amendment. Id. at 392. Justice Powell, in his
concurring opinion, however, did find a right of access in the first amendment. Id. at
397 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 392-93. See supra note 3 (discusses the conflict over whether the first
amendment is absolute or must be balanced against other constitutional rights).
54. 443 U.S. at 387-91. Justice Stevens repeatedly referred to "trials" even though
the closure order in the case excluded the press from a pretrial hearing. See, e.g., id
at 378 ("the danger of publicity concerning a pre-trial suppression hearing is particu-
larly acute"). Cf. id at 384 (sixth amendment provides no support for the public's
"'right to attend a criminal trial"). Chief Justice Burger, apparently noticing the ambi-
guity in Justice Stewart's language, stressed in his concurring opinion that the scope
of Gannett is limited to pretrial hearings. Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
also Stephenson, supra note 3 1, at 63 (expressing uncertainty in the majority opinion's
intended reach).
The press, also, expressed uncertainty: See, e.g., Birmingham Post-Herald, Aug.
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The following year, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,55 the
Court squarely addressed the first amendment issue suggested in Gan-
nett.56 The Court determined, contrary to the Gannett decision up-
holding closure of pretrial hearings," that the press has a
constitutionally protected right of access to criminal trials. 8 In Rich-
mond, the trial court granted the defense attorney's unopposed re-
quest for exclusion of the press in order to prevent prejudicial
information from reaching jurors during recesses. 9 The judge or-
dered closure without any consideration of alternative measures.6 1
Distinguishing Gannett,61 the Supreme Court stressed that notwith-
standing an historical presumption of openness, 62 the sixth amend-
ment does not require courtroom inclusion of the press at criminal
trials.63 The first amendment, on the other hand, implicitly forbids
21, 1979, at 4, col. 2 (Gannett "cloudy"); Baltimore Sun, Sept. 22, 1979, at 14, col. 3
(Gannett "incoherent"); Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1979, at 15, col. 3 (Gannett
"mushy").
55. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
56. Id. at 575-80.
57. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
58. 448 U.S. at 579-80. The Court noted that the factual situation present in Gan.
nelt did not require the Court to decide whether the press has a right of access to
trials, only pretrial suppression hearings. Id. at 564.
59. Id. at 559-60. Defendant's counsel, without objection from the prosecution,
requested closure to prevent "information being shuffled back and forth when we
recess. . . ." Id. at 559-60. This was the fourth trial on a murder charge: the first
had been reversed on appeal; the second and third ended in mistrial because jurors
had obtained prejudicial information about the defendant through the press. Id. at
559. The trial court denied the press' request for a hearing in order to challenge the
order as an abridgement of the rights of the public and press. The trial court deter-mined that the defendant's interest in obtaining a fair trial outweighed the interests of
the press. Id. at 561. The Virginia statute giving the trial court power to close the
courtroom provides in part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether same be felony or misdemeanor cases,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose pres-
ence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the ac-
cused to a public trial shall not be violated.
VA. CODE § 19.2-66 (Supp. 1980).
60. Id. at 580-81. The Court embellished this order with a list of manageable
alternatives as noted in previous cases such as Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. at 539, 563-65 and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 357-62. 448 U.S. at 581.
See supra note 44 for discussion of measures which avoid courtroom closure.
61. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
62. 448 U.S. at 564-69.
63. Id. at 575. Agreeing with the Gannett holding that the sixth amendment guar-
antee of inclusion to criminal trials may be claimed only by the defendant, Chief
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courtroom exclusion of the press.' The Court reasoned that a pro-
tected right of access emanates from the first amendment.65 Other-
wise, freedom of the press would be a meaningless guarantee in the
context of criminal trial coverage.66 Since this right of access is not
absolute,67 trial courts must first consider less restrictive alternatives
before ordering courtroom closure.6" In Richmond, the trial court
conspicuously neglected to do so.69
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court"° presented the Supreme
Court with the first constitutional conflict between the press' newly
recognized right of access to criminal trials7 and a statute requiring
courtroom closure.72 The Court balanced the state's asserted inter-
ests concerning juvenile sex assault victims with the rights of the
Justice Burger, in Richmond, then sought constitutional protection of the right of in-
clusion to trials. This he found inuring to the press implicitly through the first
amendment. Id.
64. Id. at 575 (Burger, C.J.) (the first amendment protects "the right of everyone
to attend criminal trials" so as to give meaning to the explicit first amendment guar-
anties which allow the public to discuss government operations). Id. at 575, 576.
65. Id. at 575. The Chief Justice reasoned that the first amendment, as applied to
the states through the fourteenth, forms an assurance that free public discussion of
governmental functions must remain unfettered. Id. Considering the historical and
philosophical underpinnings of the open trial tradition, id. at 564-74, the Chief Justice
concluded that a free flow of communication concerning criminal trials is of supreme
importance, id. at 575. Summary closure of courtrooms in situations in which crimi-
nal defendants do not request closure for protection of their fourteenth amendment
right to due process completely truncates the first amendment's purpose of assuring
open communication. 1d. at 576.
66. 448 U.S. at 575-76. The Court "recognized that 'without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."' Id. at 576, quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
67. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (restrictions on the right of access to criminal trials would
be as acceptable as other constitutional restrictions on access to public forums based
on time, place and manner considerations).
68. Id. at 581. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. But see 448 U.S. at 604-
05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discretion of state judges should be unfettered; no for-
mal explanations for closure orders are necessary).
69. 448 U.S. at 581.
70, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
71. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discusses the Richmond
holding).
72. 457 U.S. at 610. See supra note 7 for the text of the Massachusetts statute. In
Gannett and Richmond, courtroom closure resulted from the trial judges' discretion-
ary exercise, rather than a legislative mandate. See supra notes 50 and 59 and accom-
panying text.
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press.73 First, the Court conceded that the goals of protecting young
sex assault victims from undue courtroom stress and encouraging
these victims to report crimes and testify at trial were compelling
state interests. 74 Nevertheless, the Court held that the statute, as con-
strued, imposed an excessive restriction on the press' right of access to
criminal courtrooms. 75 Because the statute mandates closure even
when a juvenile sex assault victim might not need or want press ex-
clusion,76 the Court declared it unconstitutionally overbroad.77 The
Court also doubted the efficacy of the statute since the statute could
not constitutionally prevent publication of the victim's name and tes-
timony7' and therefore failed to eliminate all unwanted publicity.
Finally, the Court noted that the state did not offer any empirical
evidence that the statute's mandatory operation promoted the state's
asserted interests. 79 As an alternative, the Court suggested that trial
courts continue to exercise discretionary closure power only after
conducting case by case inquiries into the particular complainant's
73. 457 U.S. at 609 (acknowledging that the right of access to criminal trials is not
an absolute constitutional guarantee but that restrictions on this policy must be justi-
fied by showing compelling state interests).
74. 457 U.S. at 609. See supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text (discusses
the sex offense victims' courtroom trauma).
75. 457 U.S. at 610.
76. Id. at 608 n.21 (the asserted state interest of protecting the victim from embar-
rassment would be meaningless when the victim wants the public to be aware of the
details of the assailant's acts).
77. Id. at 609 (mandatory closure serves the state's asserted interests no better
than a discretionary, case-by-case approach to closure). See also Richmond Newspa-
per, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (courts have the discretion to close the
courtroom under sensitive circumstances); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
401 (1979) (trial courts must give motions for closure case-by-case consideration).
78. 457 U.S. at 610. Courts have recognized the press' complete freedom to pub-
lish information already on public record, regardless of the potential impact on the
subject's sensibilities. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496
(1975) (because the press may publish any item of public record with impunity, publi-
cation of a deceased rape victim's name is not an act of defamation). See also
WXYZ, Inc. v. Hand, 463 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Mich. 1979) (order to delay publication
of names of victim or accused until arraignment is an invalid prior restraint); Poteet v.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 172, 584 P.2d 1310, 1318 (1978) (informa-
tion about a 14-year-old rape victim was privileged). Cf. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (order to delay publication of information ob-
tained at a juvenile proceeding, but not yet public record is an invalid prior restraint).
79. 457 U.S. at 610. (Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, noted that the purpose of
the closure statute is not to eliminate all unpleasant publicity, but to avoid having a
large, unfamiliar audience in the courtroom during the victim's testimony).
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emotional status.80
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in which Justice Rehn-
quist joined, attacked the majority's interpretation of Richmond.s '
The Chief Justice, author of the Court's opinion in Richmond, main-
tained that Richmond did not permit press access to all portions of all
trials.8 2 The dissent further argued that if the state has shown a com-
pelling interest behind drafting a legislative restriction of a first
amendment right, the statute's rational relationship to attaining the
stated goal renders it constitutional.8 3 The dissent rejected the major-
ity's strict scrutiny requirement that the statute be narrowly tailored
to effect nothing more than the asserted goals.8 4 As a policy matter,
the dissent believed that any small success that mandatory closure
has in encouraging victims to help prosecute sex offenders justifies
potential statutory overbreadth s5
The Globe Court's approach to press rights is a consistent applica-
tion of principles previously established in Gannett and Richmond. 6
The Court once again recognized that criminal trials are presump-
80. Id. at 609 and n. 15 (advocating a case-by-case determination of the need for
closure, yet recognizing in footnote that representatives of the public and press should
be given the opportunity to protest exclusion from these hearings regarding the need
for closure).
81. Id. at 613. Justice Stevens dissented in a separate opinion based on his obser-
vation that the interpretation of the statute under attack did not exist until after the
trial court issued its order based on a different interpretation. Id. at 620.
82. 457 U.S. at 614.
83. Id. at 616-17. The Chief Justice considered the statute adequately narrow in
that it was interpreted to apply only to trials involving juvenile sex assault victims.
Further, the Chief Justice noted that the statute did not cut off all press access to
pertinent information. Since the trial transcript is public record, available immedi-
ately after it is made, the press and public maintain the right to inspect the victim's
testimony after it is given. While this procedure lacks the immediacy of courtroom
scrutinization, the Chief Justice argued that it would be a realistic approach especially
in light of the recently sanctioned practice of allowing television cameras admission to
the courtroom. Id. at 618.
84. Id. at 613. The Chief Justice characterized the majority holding as a "gross
invasion of state authority" and a "cavalier rejection of the serious interests support-
ing Massachusetts' mandatory closure rule." Id.
85. Id. at 616. The Chief Justice also noted that mandatory closure eliminates the
possibility that some judges might not close a trial, even though the circumstances
warrant such action. If a state has a mandatory closure policy, victims will know
better what to expect. The state could thereby minimi the possibility that some sex
offense victims would hesitate to report or testify about a sex offense for fear of testi-
fying before a large audience. Id. at 618.
86. See supra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
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tively open to the public and press. 7 In invalidating the mandatory
closure statute as too broad a restriction on the press' right of access,
the Globe Court affirmed Richmond.8 The Court implied, however,
that a statute allowing discretionary closure would pass constitutional
muster.89
Globe reinforced the Richmond Court's suggestion that trial courts
may impose restrictions on the press if they formally balance the
competing interests and consider possible alternatives.9" While the
Globe Court appears to take a bold stand in protecting freedom of
the press from legislative encroachment, it does not adequately ad-
dress the problem of protecting innocent victims as well as persons
wrongly accused from the harsh results of publicity overkill. Since it
is clear from Globe that this dilemma cannot be resolved in the state
legislatures, trial court judges are required to use extraordinary care
in balancing all relevant interests before exercising discretion.
Joanne Hurd
87. 457 U.S. at 603, 605. But see id. at 614 (Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, argu-
ing that sex offense trials have traditionally been closed to the public during portions
of testimony). See also supra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text (examples of
closure cases).
88. 457 U.S. at 610.
89. Id. at 608 n.22 (noting that a number of states have enacted statutes providing
for discretionary closure).
90. Id. at 609. See supra notes 44 and 60 for alternative measures.
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